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Abstract—When selfish users share a road network and mini-
mize their individual travel costs, the equilibrium they reach can
be worse than the socially optimal routing. Tolls are often used
to mitigate this effect in traditional congestion games, where
all vehicle contribute identically to congestion. However, with
the proliferation of autonomous vehicles and driver-assistance
technology, vehicles become heterogeneous in how they contribute
to road latency. This magnifies the potential inefficiencies due
to selfish routing and invalidates traditional tolling methods. To
address this, we consider a network of parallel roads where the
latency on each road is an affine function of the quantity of flow
of each vehicle type. We provide tolls (which differentiate between
vehicle types) which are guaranteed to minimize social cost at
equilibrium. The tolls are a function of a calculated optimal
routing; to enable this tolling, we prove that some element in the
set of optimal routings has a lack of cycles in a graph representing
the way vehicles types share roads. We then show that unless a
planner can differentiate between vehicle types in the tolls given,
the resulting equilibrium can be unboundedly worse than the
optimal routing, and that marginal cost tolling fails in our setting.
I. INTRODUCTION
How autonomous vehicles will change the efficiency of
traffic networks is still ambiguous. While the platooning
capabilities of autonomous vehicles may increase the capacity
of roads up to three-fold [1], when users choose their routes
selfishly, the presence of capacity-improving autonomous ve-
hicles may worsen congestion [2], [3], even beyond the selfish
equilibria which emerge in the presence of only human drivers
[4]. Prior works have studied how to use tolling to mitigate
these effects in networks with a single vehicle type [5] or for
roads shared between human drivers and autonomous vehicles
which are uniform in their autonomous capabilities [6], [7].
However, currently there are many different vehicles on the
market with different levels of autonomy, including multiple
Adaptive Cruise Control (ACC) systems, which affect road
congestion differently [8]. Moreover, even within human-
driven vehicles, different types of vehicles vary in how they
affect congestion. To adequately understand and control traffic
networks, models must incorporate multiple vehicle types.
Because of this, we consider tolling for a network shared
between multiple vehicle types, each affecting road latency
differently. This is a setting for which no tolling results yet
exist, absent extremely restrictive assumptions [9].
We consider a network of parallel roads with an arbitrary
number of vehicle types, where the latency on each road is an
affine function of the flow of each vehicle type on the road. We
provide a theoretical property of optimal routing in this setting
and use this property to establish optimal tolls. We then show
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that tolls must be differentiated, meaning the social planner
must be able to levy different tolls to each vehicle type on a
road. We further show the failure of a classic tolling scheme,
and conclude with a numerical example of our scheme.
We summarize our contributions as follows.
1) We derive a theoretical property of the set of optimal
routing,
2) We use this property to design tolls which guarantee that
the only existing selfish equilibrium also minimizes the
social cost, and
3) We show the possible failure of nondifferentiated tolls
and marginal cost tolling.
Previous Work. Our work builds on the field of congestion
games, which studies routing of vehicles over transportation
networks, where each road is defined as an edge of a graph,
where the latency experienced by users of that edge is a
(typically increasing) function of the vehicle flow on that edge.
There are several relevant focuses of study in this field. The
first is optimal traffic assignment, which studies how to route
vehicle flow in a manner which minimizes the social cost,
typically understood to be the aggregate latency experienced
by all users [10]. Another is understanding equilibria which
arise when all users are self-interested and choose routes to
minimizes their individual travel latency [11], [12]. Another
vein of research is understanding and bounding the gap
between social cost when users are routed optimally with
respect to the social cost compared to when users choose
routes selfishly [4]. Many works study tolling and seek to
find optimal tolls, which, when applied, make it so that the
only equilibria that exist will minimize the social cost [5].
Other works seek to improve the efficiency of equilibria by
persuading drivers with route recommendations [13], [14].
Some previous works extend these topics to setting where
each road has multiple vehicle types which affect congestion
differently, dealing with traffic assignment [9], equilibria [15],
bounding the gap between optimal and equilibria costs [16],
[17], and tolling [18]. However, the cited works on traffic
assignment, equilibria, and tolling have a restrictive critical
assumption that is violated in the general setting, including
in the model developed below for mixed autonomy. A pre-
liminary version of this work studies our setting when there
are only two vehicle types on each road [7]. Also in the
setting of two vehicle types, [2] shows that seemingly para-
doxically, converting human-driven vehicles to more efficient
autonomous vehicles can worsen social cost at equilibrium;
in another work the authors bound this effect [19]. In [6],
the authors provide optimal tolls for general networks with
multiple source-destination pairs in the homogeneous case,
where the difference in how each of the two vehicle types
affect congestion is constant across all roads in the network.
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However, none of the prior works find optimal tolls for traffic
networks with more than two vehicle types; in light of this
we find optimal tolls for parallel networks with affine latency
functions with no restrictions on the form of the affine latency
functions aside from requiring it to be increasing with respect
to the flow of each vehicle type.
II. MODEL
We consider a network of n parallel roads with vehicle flow
demand from m vehicle types. We use [n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} and
[m] = {1, 2, . . . ,m} to denote the set of roads and vehicle
types, respectively. In general, for an integer x, we define [x] =
{1, 2, . . . , x}. We generally use i to index a road and j to
index a vehicle type. We consider nonatomic vehicle flow and
use f ji ≥ 0 to denote the magnitude of vehicle flow of type
j ∈ [m] on road i ∈ [n]. We consider inelastic flow demand,
where each vehicle type j has flow demand f¯ j ; a feasible
routing f is one such that
∑
i∈[n] f
j
i = f¯
j for all j ∈ [m] and
f ji ≥ 0 for all i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m].
Definition 1. Let Ff¯ denote the set of feasible routings for
flow demand vector f¯ . Then, Ff¯ = {(f ji )i∈[n],j∈[m] : f ji ≥
0 ∧ i ∈ [n] ∧ j ∈ [m] ∧∑i∈[n] f ji = f¯ j ∀j ∈ [m]}.
We define the flow vector as
f =
[
f11 , f
2
1 , . . . , f
m
1 , f
1
2 , f
2
2 , . . . , f
m
n
]T
.
We also define the flow vector on road i as fi =[
f1i , f
2
i , . . . , f
m
i
]T
.
Each road i has a latency function that is experienced
identically by all vehicles on the road. We consider vehicle
types with different autonomous technologies allowing them
each to maintain different headway to the vehicle in front of
it. Let hji denote the nominal space used by vehicle of type
j on road i, where the nominal space includes the length of
the vehicle and its nominal headway. We then model road
capacity to be inversely related to the average space occupied
by a vehicle on a road [20], [21]:
qi(fi) = vidi
∑
j∈[m]
f ji /(
∑
j∈[m]
f ji h
j
i ) ,
where vi and di respectively denote the free-flow length of
the road and the length of the road. Using this in conjunction
with the Bureau of Public Roads latency model [22], we find
latency function
`i(fi) = ti(1 + ρi(
∑
j∈[m]
hjif
j
i )
σi) ,
where ti denotes the free-flow latency and ρi and σi are model
parameters. Choosing σi = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and letting a0i = ti
and aji = ρih
j
i , we derive our latency function:
`i(fi) = a
0
i +
∑
j∈[m]
ajif
j
i . (1)
As mentioned above, a0i denotes the free-flow latency of
road i and aji denotes the scaling by which the latency on road
i increases with the addition of vehicle type j. Accordingly,
a0i ≥ 0 and aji ≥ 0 for all roads and vehicle types.
Assumption 1. The latency of each road is strictly increasing
with the flow of each vehicle type on that road. Mathematically,
∂`i
∂fji
(f) > 0 ∀i ∈ [n],∀j ∈ [m]. This is equivalent to the
condition aji > 0 for all i ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
We wish to minimize the social cost, which we consider to
be the total latency experienced by all users of the network:
J(f) =
∑
i∈[n]
(
∑
j∈[m]
f ji )`i(fi) . (2)
We will later derive properties of the set of optimal routings
F∗ = arg min
f∈Ff¯
J(f) . (3)
Note that in general the optimal routing is not unique, and
multiple different routing choices can yield the same minimum
cost. We do not make claims about all routings that satisfy (3),
rather we will make claims that apply to at least one routing
in the set of routings that minimize the social cost (i.e. at least
one routing in the set F∗).
In addition to considering the socially optimal routings,
we also consider how selfish users will choose their routes.
To influence this user choice, we levy tolls, where tolls for
different user types can differ on a given road. We model user
type j on road i as experiencing cost
cji (f) = `i(f) + τ
j
i , (4)
where τ ji is the toll levied on user type j on road i. Note that
only the toll can make users of different types experience dif-
ferent costs on the same road; we assume all users experience
road latency identically. Also note that tolls are considered to
be circulated back into the public coffers and are therefore
not included in the social cost (2). We consider users who are
myopic and selfish; we therefore model users as following a
Nash Equilibrium.
Definition 2. A flow f is a Nash Equilibrium if f ji > 0 implies
cji (f) ≤ cji′(f) for all i, i′ ∈ [n], j ∈ [m].
Since we consider a networks of parallel roads, a flow is
at Nash Equilibrium if no user can decrease their cost by
switching roads.
We define some notation to make it easier to discuss
properties of specific routings. For a specific routing f , we use
N fj to denote the set of roads with positive flow of vehicle
type j:
N fj = {i : f ji > 0 ∧ i ∈ [n]} .
Similarly, we use Mfi to denote the set of vehicle types with
positive flow on road i for the routing f :
Mfi = {j : f ji > 0 ∧ j ∈ [m]} .
The theoretical results established in the next section con-
ceptualize vehicle flow on roads in the form of a graph, where
for each specific routing f , a graph can be constructed. We
construct a bipartite graph G = (U, V,E) where one set of
nodes is the set of roads (U = [n]) and one set of nodes is
the set of vehicle types (V = [m]). The set of edges connect
vehicle types to roads on which they have positive flow, i.e.
E = {(i, j) : i ∈ [n] ∧ j ∈Mfi } , (5)
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Fig. 1: Two example routings for a network with four roads and three vehicle
types. In (a), vehicle type 1 has positive flow on roads 1 and 2, type 2 has
positive flow on roads 2 and 3, and type 3 has positive flow on road 1, 3, and
4. (b) shows the corresponding bipartite graph. (c) shows a similar routing
but type 3 has zero flow on road 3, and (d) shows its corresponding bipartite
graph.
or equivalently, E = {(i, j) : f ji > 0 ∧ i ∈ [n] ∧ j ∈ [m]}.
In other words, for a routing f , there is an edge between the
nodes denoting road i and vehicle type j if there is positive
flow of type j on road i. We illustrate this in Figure 1.
III. TOLLING
In this section we establish tolls which ensure that the social
cost is minimized in any resulting equilibrium. We do this
in two theorems: the first establishes properties about some
routing in the set of routings which minimize the social cost,
and the second provides optimal tolls (which are constructed
based on the routing which is proved to exist in the first
theorem) and proves their optimality. We begin with the first
result.
Theorem 1. There exists a routing in the set of routings
minimizing social cost, f ∈ F∗, such that G(f) is acyclic,
where G = (U, V,E) is constructed as in (5), i.e. where nodes
are the roads and vehicle types, and edges exist between road
i and vehicle type j when f ji > 0.
Proof. We prove this theorem constructively. We show that if
there exists a routing in the set F∗ that has a cyclic bipartite
graph, we can break each cycle without altering the cost. We
do this by showing that for a cyclic routing f ′, there exists
a feasible direction d and that moving in the direction d will
not alter the cost and will eventually break the cycle.
The second-order partial derivatives of (2) are as follows
∂2J
∂f ji ∂f
j′
i′
(f) =
{
0 if i 6= i′
aji + a
j′
i otherwise .
Since we define f =
[
f11 , f
2
1 , . . . , f
m
1 , f
1
2 , f
2
2 , . . . , f
m
n
]T
,
the Hessian matrix is therefore block-diagonal in the following
form:
H =

H1 0 . . . 0
0 H2 . . . 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . Hn
 ,
where the block corresponding to road i is
Hi =

2a1i a
1
i + a
2
i . . . a
1
i + a
m
i
a1i + a
2
i 2a
2
i . . . a
2
i + a
m
i
...
...
. . .
...
a1i + a
m
i a
2
i + a
m
i . . . 2a
m
i
 .
Consider a routing f ′ which minimizes social cost and has
a corresponding cyclic graph. We will alter this routing and
break the cycle while maintaining the same social cost.
Since the graph is bipartite, any cycle will have the same
number of nodes of each type. For some cycle in f ′, let us use
r ∈ {2, 3, . . . ,min(m,n)} to denote the number of roads (and
therefore vehicle types as well) in a simple cycle. The vehicles
and roads are indexed arbitrarily, so let us consider the cycle
to be comprised of the first r roads (roads {1, 2, . . . , r} and
the first r vehicle types (vehicle types {1, 2, . . . , r}). Let road
1 be shared between vehicle types 1 and 2, road 2 be shared
between vehicle types 2 and 3, and so on, until road r which
is shared between types r and 1. The remaining roads and
vehicle types are indexed arbitrarily.
Based on this feasible routing f ′, we construct another
routing f˜ which is also feasible. Consider flow f ′+αd, where
α ∈ R≥0 and d is a direction vector as follows. As with f ,
let d =
[
d1, d2, . . . , dn
]T
, where di corresponds to the flow
change on road i, specifically di =
[
d1i , d
2
i , . . . , d
m
i
]T
. We
choose d1 =
[−1, 0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . 0]T , where dr1 = 1. We
choose d2 =
[
1,−1, 0, . . . , 0]T , and, for i = {3, . . . , r}, di is
equal to di−1 circularly shifted downward. For i /∈ [r], dji = 0
for all j ∈ [m].
The direction defined above corresponds to shifting some
flow of type 1 from road 1 to road 2, some flow of type 2
from road 2 to road 3, and so on, ending in some flow of type
r shifting from road r to road 1. With this defined direction,
the flow vector f ′ + αd is feasible for some range α ∈ [0, α],
which we show as follows, using Definition 1 (feasible flow).
When starting from a feasible flow, moving in the direction
d satisfies conservation of flow, as
∑
i∈[n] d
j
i = 0 for all
j ∈ [m]. Moreover, by the definition of flow f ′, dji < 0
only when f ′ji > 0, meaning that in the direction d, flow
of a certain vehicle type on a road is decreased only if there
exists positive flow of that vehicle type already. As such, we
find the maximum feasible range to be α = mink∈[r] fkk , since
at this point the nonnegativity constraint becomes active. The
reason it is the minimum of fkk , with k ∈ [r], is because in
direction d, some of vehicle type k is shifted off road k. Since
at α = α the nonnegativity constraint becomes active, at the
flow f˜ = f ′ + αd, the cycle on roads [r] has been broken.
Note that no new cycles have been induced, as dji can only
be greater than zero when f ′ji is already greater than zero,
meaning no new edges are added to the graph by moving in
direction d.
We now investigate the social cost at f˜ . Since the objective
function is quadratic (and therefore analytic), by a trivial
application of Taylor’s inequality we can express J(f˜) as a
second-order Taylor expansion around f ′ as follows.
J(f˜) = J(f ′) + 〈∇J(f ′), αd〉+ 1
2
αdTH(f ′)αd ,
where H(f ′) is the Hessian of J evaluated at f ′. First-order
optimality conditions imply that 〈∇J(f ′), αd〉 = 0, since d
only has nonzero elements where inequalities for feasible flow
are not tight; thus for f ′ to be optimal, the derivative of J(f ′)
in the direction of d must be zero. We now investigate the
latter term, ignoring the scalar α
2
2 . Since H is block-diagonal,
dTHd =
∑
i∈[n]
dTi Hidi .
Let us inspect dTi Hidi. For any specific road i
′, di′ has one
entry that is 1 and one that is −1. Let us assign p and p′ such
that dpi′ = 1 and d
p′
i′ = −1. Then,
dTi′Hi′di′ =
∑
j′∈[m]
dj
′
i′
∑
j∈[m]
(aj
′
i′ + a
j
i′)d
j
i′
=
∑
j′∈[m]
dj
′
i′ [(a
j′
i′ + a
p
i′)− (aj
′
i′ + a
p′
i′ )]
=
∑
j′∈[m]
dj
′
i′ (a
p
i′ − ap
′
i′ ) = (a
p
i′ − ap
′
i′ )− (api′ − ap
′
i′ )
= 0 .
Thus, dTHd = 0 as well, so
J(f˜) = J(f ′) .
We have thus constructed a flow f˜ which has the same
social cost as a socially optimal flow f ′, which has broken a
cycle in the graph representing f ′ without introducing a new
cycle. Since the number of roads and vehicle types is finite,
this process can be repeated until we arrive at a flow which
has no cycles and has a social cost which optimizes (2). This
proves the theorem statement.
Corollary 1. No two vehicle types share more than one road
with positive flow of both vehicle types.
We next provide a theorem describing tolls, based on the
routing proven to exist above, which will lead the vehicles to
follow the optimal routing.
Theorem 2. Consider a routing f∗ with an associated acyclic
graph, which is proven to exist in Theorem 1. Then levy the
following tolls τ(f∗):
τ ji (f
∗) =
{
µ− `i(f∗) if i ∈ N f
∗
j
P otherwise.
(6)
Under Assumption 1, and for some constant µ and sufficiently
large P , the only equilibrium that exists is the flow f∗.
Proof. We use the following properties related to the tolls
described above.
Property 1. As a result of the tolls in Theorem 2, if two
vehicle types have positive flow on a road in routing f∗, then
the resulting tolls τ(f∗) will be such that the two vehicle types
experience identical cost on that road. Mathematically,
cji (f) = c
j′
i (f) ∀f ∈ Ff¯ ∧ i ∈ [n] ∧ j, j′ ∈Mf
∗
i .
Property 2. As a result of Definition 2, if two roads have
positive flow of a specific vehicle type at equilibrium, then the
roads have equal cost for that vehicle type. Formally, if f is
an equilibrium, then
cji (f) = c
j
i′(f) ∀j ∈ [m] ∧ i, i′ ∈ N fj .
Property 3. For sufficiently large P , users in equilibrium will
not use a road with toll P . Formally, for equilibrium flow f
experiencing tolls τ(f∗),
f ji = 0 ∀j ∈ [m] ∧ i ∈ [n] \ N f
∗
j .
We now prove the theorem by contradiction. Assume there
exists some feasible flow f˜ 6= f∗ which is at equilibrium under
tolls τ(f∗). Since f˜ 6= f∗,
∃i ∈ [n] ∧ j ∈ [m] s.t. f˜ ji > f∗ji . (7)
From Property 3, i ∈ N f∗j . Then, resulting from (7), either
(i) ∃j′ ∈Mf∗i s.t. f˜ j
′
i < f
∗j′
i , or
(ii) cji (f˜) > c
j
i (f
∗) (from Assumption 1).
If (i), then it must be the case that
(iii) ∃i′ ∈ N f∗j′ s.t. f˜ j
′
i′ > f
∗j′
i′ ,
due to Definition 1 (flow conservation), which implies, from
Definition 2,
cj
′
i (f˜) ≥ cj
′
i′ (f˜) . (8)
Then again, as a result of (iii) either (i) or (ii) must be the
case, where i is replaced by i′ and j is replaced by j′. This
process continues until we reach (ii). This terminal point must
exist since the bipartite graph of roads and vehicle types is
acyclic. Say the termination point is on vehicle type j(k) on
road i(p). Then,
cj
(k)
i(p)
(f˜) > cj
(k)
i(p)
(f∗) = cji (f
∗) , (9)
where the equality results from Properties 1 and 2. Further,
due to Definition 2 and Property 1,
cj
(k)
i(p)
(f˜) ≤ cj(k)
i(p−1)(f˜) = c
j(k−1)
i(p−1) (f˜) ≤ . . . ≤ c
j′
i (f˜) = c
j
i (f˜) .
(10)
We follow a similar logic down another branch. Reusing the
indices j′ and i′ to a new use, we consider the other result of
(7). By Definition 1,
∃i′ ∈ N f∗j s.t. f˜ ji′ < f∗ji′ . (11)
Next, consider the results of (11). Similarly to above, either
(iv) ∃j′ ∈ Mf∗i′ s.t. f˜ j
′
i′ > f
∗j′
i′ (where j
′ ∈ Mf∗i′ due to
Property 3), or
(v) cj
′
i′ (f˜) < c
j′
i′ (f
∗) (from Assumption 1).
If (iv), then it must be the case that
(vi) ∃i′′ ∈ N f∗j′ s.t. f˜ j
′
i′′ < f
∗j′
i′′ ,
due to Definition 1 (flow conservation), which implies, from
Assumption 1,
cj
′
i′′(f˜) ≥ cj
′
i′ (f˜) . (12)
11
Veh. type
Road
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
Vehicle type
Road
2
3 2
34
!!! ↑ !"! ↓
!!# ↓
!$# ↑$$# ! ↑
!"" ↑
!#" ↓$#" ! ↓
(a) (b)
Fig. 2: Flow changes for the proposed new flow at equilibrium.
Similarly to above, as a result of (vi), either (iv) or (v) must
be the case, where i′ is replaced by i′′ and j is replaced by j′.
This process continues until we reach (vi). Say the termination
point is on vehicle type j(r) on road i(s). Then,
cj
(r)
i(s)
(f˜) < cj
(r)
i(s)
(f∗) = cji (f
∗) , (13)
where the equality results from Properties 1 and 2. Further,
due to Definition 2 and Property 1,
cj
(r)
i(s)
(f˜) ≥ cj(r)
i(s−1)(f˜) = c
j(r−1)
i(s−1) (f˜) ≥ . . . ≥ c
j′
i (f˜) = c
j
i (f˜) .
(14)
We then string together (9) and (13) to find
cj
(k)
i(p)
(f˜) > cj
(r)
i(s)
(f˜) .
We also put together (10) and (14) to find
cj
(k)
i(p)
(f˜) ≤ cj(r)
i(s)
(f˜) ,
which yields a contradiction.
We show an example of this proof construction. Consider
the routing in Figure 1 (c-d), with the proof illustrated in
Figure 2. As before, f∗ denotes the flow which minimizes
the social cost and satisfies the condition in Theorem 1. We
walk through a specific alternate flow f˜ 6= f∗ and show that
it cannot exist in equilibrium when tolls are applied as in
Theorem 2, where the tolls are based on flow f∗.
Let us consider the flow f˜ to have f˜11 > f
∗1
1, meaning the
flow of type 1 on road 1 is higher in this new flow vector.
By conservation of flow, f˜12 < f
∗1
2. Then, either f˜
3
1 < f
∗3
1,
meaning the flow of type 3 on road 1 decreases in the new
flow vector, or c11(f˜) > c
1
1(f
∗) (by Assumption 1). Consider
the former case. Then by conservation of flow and the fact
that f˜ must be in equilibrium and the tolling structure prevents
flow of type 3 on any road outside of the set {1, 4}, f˜34 > f∗34.
Then by Assumption 1, c34(f˜) > c
3
4(f
∗).
Following the other branch of the diagram, as a result of
f˜12 < f
∗1
2, either f˜
2
2 > f
∗2
2 or c
1
2(f˜) < c
1
2(f
∗). If the former,
again f˜23 < f
∗2
3, resulting in c
2
3(f˜) < c
2
3(f
∗).
Due to the Properties 1 and 2,
c34(f
∗) = c31(f
∗) = c11(f
∗) = c12(f
∗) = c22(f
∗) = c23(f
∗) ,
and combining it with the inequalities above, c34(f˜) > c
2
3(f˜).
However, since f˜ must be at equilibrium (yielding the inequal-
ities), and from Property 1 (yielding the equalities),
c34(f˜) ≤ c31(f˜) = c11(f˜) ≤ c12(f˜) = c22(f˜) ≤ c32(f˜) ,
which yields a contradiction.
s t
`1(f
1
1 , f
2
1 ) = kf
1
1 + f
2
1
`2(f
1
2 , f
2
2 ) = f
1
2 + kf
2
2
Fig. 3: Example of the futility of undifferentiated tolling in a simple network.
Consider flow demands f¯1 = 1 and f¯2 = 1. The equilibrium under the
best undifferentiated toll may be arbitrarily worse than the socially optimal
routing.
IV. NECESSITY OF TOLLING
In this section we show the necessity of the tolling scheme
proposed in the previous section, both in that tolls must differ-
entiate between vehicle types, and that well-known marginal
cost tolling [5] fails in our setting.
Undifferentiated tolls. We show via example example that un-
less different vehicle types can experience differentiated tolls,
the equilibrium social cost can be unboundedly worse than
the social optimum. A previous work has shown that when a
network has multiple source-destination pairs, undifferentiated
tolls may not induce a socially optimal flow [6]. As in [7], we
extend these results to a simple two-road network and show
that under undifferentiated tolling, the equilibrium can have a
social cost which is arbitrary worse than the social optimum.
Consider the network in Fig. 3, with flow demands f¯1 = 1
and f¯2 = 1, and let k ≥ 1. The socially optimal routing
has social cost 2, with f11 = 0 and f
2
1 = 1. Without loss of
generality, we can consider a toll on just one of the roads, since
only the difference between the tolls on the two roads will
affect the equilibrium. This example is symmetric, so without
loss of generality let the top road be the road with a positive
toll. In the resulting worst-case equilibrium, the top road has
some flow of type 1 and the bottom road has the remaining
flow of type 1 and all the flow of type 2. To investigate how
well the best toll can do, we derive the following.
min
f11∈[0,1]
f11 `1(f
1
1 , 0) + (1− f11 + 1)`2(1− f11 , 1)
= min
f11∈[0,1]
k(f11 )
2 + (1− f11 + 1)(1− f11 + k)
=
7k + 3
4
− 1
k + 1
< 2k .
Though the toll decreases the social cost from that of the
worst-case equilibrium, the social cost still increases linearly
with k, while the socially optimal cost is constant with respect
to k. This shows that the optimal undifferentiated tolling can
result in arbitrarily worse social cost than the socially optimal
routing even in this simple setting.
Marginal Cost Tolling. We next show by example that the
classic marginal cost tolling, which is shown to be optimal in
the case of a single vehicle type on a general network [5], is
not optimal in the multitype case in a parallel network with
affine latency functions. Consider the network in Figure 4, with
two vehicle types, where the vehicle types have flow demand
f¯1 = 2 and f¯2 = 3.
s t
`1(f
1
1 , f
2
1 ) = 4.2f
1
1 + 2f
2
1
`2(f
1
2 , f
2
2 ) = 2f
1
2 + f
2
2
Fig. 4: Example of the nonoptimality of marginal cost tolling in a simple
network. Consider flow demands f¯1 = 2 and f¯2 = 3. Under marginal cost
tolling, there exists an equilibrium with nonoptimal social cost.
To find the optimal routing, we use Theorem 1 to solve
four convex optimizations instead of one nonconvex one. The
optimal routing is f11 = 0 and f
2
1 = 2, for a social cost of 23.
With marginal cost tolls, the toll for a vehicle type on a
road is a function of the vehicle flows currently on that road
– in the affine case, τ j,mci = a
j
i
∑
j∈[m] f
j
i . With these tolls,
we find an equilibrium with f11 = 105/128 and f
2
1 = 95/128;
since both roads have positive flow of both vehicle types, we
confirm that each vehicle type experiences identical cost on
the two roads. In this equilibrium flow, the social cost is 23.6,
which is greater than the social optimum of 23. This shows
that marginal cost tolls are not optimal in this setting.
V. NUMERICAL EXAMPLE
We provide the following example to show the calculation
of the tolling scheme described in the previous section, as well
as the benefits of tolling. Consider a network of three parallel
roads and three vehicle types, with flow demands f
1
= 3,
f
2
= 2, and f
3
= 3. Let the latency functions be as follows:
`1(f
1, f2, f3) = 1 + 3f1 + f2 + f3
`2(f
1, f2, f3) = 2 + f1 + 4f2 + 2f3
`3(f
1, f2, f3) = 1 + 2f1 + f2 + 3f3 .
In this example, a possible equilibrium has all flow of type 1
on road 1, flow of type 2 on road 2, and flow of type 3 on road
3, yielding a social cost of 80. The optimal routing is shown in
Table I and has flow type 1 on roads 2 and 3, type 2 on road 3,
and type 3 on road 1, for a social cost of 32.9, approximately
a 2.5-fold improvement from the equilibrium described above.
This routing satisfies the conditions in Theorem 11. The table
also shows the proposed tolls based on this routing with µ = 5,
which is chosen to be greater than the maximum latency so
vehicles are only tolled, not subsidized.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we considered tolling on parallel roads with
multiple vehicle types and affine latency functions. We derived
a key property of optimal routing in this setting and used
this property to establish optimal tolls. Future works may
generalize these results, both in terms of the network and the
1Some networks could also have socially optimal routings with cyclic
bipartite graphs – consider a network with aji = a
j′
i on all roads for two
vehicle types j and j′. In this case j and j′ could share more than one road
in an optimal routing. As guaranteed by Theorem 1, there will also be routings
in the set of minimizers in which the they share at most one road.
TABLE I: Routings, Latency, and Tolls for the Example Network
Worst eq. routing Opt. routing Opt. Tolls
social cost: 80 social cost: 32.9
Rd f1 f2 f3 ` f1 f2 f3 ` τ1 τ2 τ3
1 3 0 0 10 0 0 3 4 P 1 1
2 0 2 0 10 2.83 0 0 4.83 P P 0.17
3 0 0 3 10 0.17 2 0 4.33 0.67 P P
considered latency functions. Further extensions of this work
will be critical in understanding traffic routing in the presence
of many vehicle types with varying levels of autonomy.
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